General Grant’s campaign strategy aimed at destroying Robert. E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia during the last years of the Civil War attracted widespread condemnation at the time. The indecisive battles of 1864 such as The Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor resulted in heavy casualties, but no clear victory. Lee’s army remained in the field and the Confederate capital Richmond was still a far off and seemingly unobtainable prize. Indeed, when the Army of the Potomac’s advance finally stalled in front of the city of Petersburg  in 1864 it appeared that Grant’s grand offensive had irrevocably failed and the sacrifices to date had been in vain.

 

Politicians, newspapers and the public had hoped that Grant’s assumption of control off all the Union armies in 1864 would bring the Civil War to a speedy conclusion after years of defeat and endless command changes. However, as 1864 wore on US Grant seemed to be as big a flop as Generals Burnside, Hooker and McClellan. Perhaps even more so, because some of these former commanders of the Army of the Potomac had only been defeated in one battle whereas Grant appeared to be recklessly fighting battle after battle without any positive result. Mrs. Lincoln reputedly described Grant as a butcher and declared that she would have been a better commander herself. In contrast, President Lincoln astutely commented that he could not afford to let Grant go because he fought and this is why ultimately Grant’s strategy in Virginia in 1864/65 helped secure victory for the Union.

 

The difference between Grant and his less successful predecessors was that he persisted even in the face of a reverse. The Union was infinitely superior to the Confederacy in regard to men and material and Grant used this to maximum advantage. Though losses were heavy for the Federals at such battles as Cold Harbor they were quickly replaced. The Confederates however were losing men at a rate that could not be sustained even though technically they were holding their own in battle. This strategy of attrition accelerated during the siege of Petersburg and the once mighty Army of Northern Virginia was reduced to a skeleton of its former self eventually forcing General Lee to seek terms at Appomattox in 1865.

 

In retrospect Grant’s sledgehammer approach of continually hitting the Confederate army with all the resources the North could muster was correct. The South could not win this sort of war because it simply could not match the resources of the Federals. However, the cost in human terms on both sides was appallingly wasteful. The terrible reality of war both then and now is that people perish no matter whether the reasons advanced for going to war are justifiable or not.