Why We Are In Iraq

Since we have now reached the five year anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq, I think it’s time to review why we are there. Over these past five years, many people have attempted to change the historical record, accuse the Bush administration of acting illegally, and fill the heads of the uneducated and uninformed with tall tales about our motives for removing Saddam Hussein’s regime. There is nothing we can do to change the past, so studying historical facts as they have been laid out ought to be simple and easy to follow. This article will serve as both a repository for those facts and an analysis of what they mean.

A Storm in the Desert

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait after negotiations had failed to resolve a dispute over oil fields and Kuwait’s increase of oil production, which was interpreted as economic warfare by the Iraqi government. After United Nations (U.N.) sanctions had failed, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 678, which authorized coalition forces to enforce the eleven previous sanctions. On January 12, 1991, the United States Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (House Joint Resolution 77). This authorization was used to enforce UNSC Resolution 678 which set a deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with previous resolutions by January 15, 1991.

After Saddam Hussein’s failure to comply, President George H. W. Bush implemented National Security Directive 54 and the United States – along with a coalition force comprised of over one million personnel from 34 countries – began Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991. By February 27, President Bush declared a cease-fire in Iraq and proclaimed that Kuwait had been liberated. The UNSC adopted Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991, bringing about a formal cease-fire that was contingent on further compliance of thirteen previous resolutions and additional goals established in the new one.

Two years after the cease-fire, President Bill Clinton authorized missile strikes against Iraq on June 26, 1993. This attack was in response to a plotted assassination attempt on former President Bush when he visited Kuwait in April of that year.

Three years later, on September 3-4, 1996, President Clinton ordered another round of missile strikes against Iraq. Responding to Iraqi aggression against the Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, the president ordered two missile strikes in two days to eliminate air-defense sites and to send Saddam Hussein a message that he should end his military actions. President Clinton stated, “When our interest in the security of our friends and allies is threatened, we will act with force if necessary.”

The One Hundred Fifth Congress passed Senate Joint Resolution 54 on January 27, 1998 which found the Iraqi government “in unacceptable and material breach of its international obligations.” The resolution cited 28 “whereas” clauses almost entirely related to Iraq’s violation of UNSC resolutions and United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) regulations. The joint resolution urged the President to “take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.”

On October 31, 1998, President Clinton signed Public Law 105-338, officially known as the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. In Section 3 of this Act, the Congress declared the following:

“It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.”

While protecting the national security interests of the United States, President Clinton ordered another round of strikes against Iraq on December 16, 1998. In a public address, the president said the purpose of this mission was “to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world.” He also added that he hoped “Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system now and comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”

A Call to Action

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which was the culmination of over two decades of radical Islamist aggressions toward the United States, the administration of President George W. Bush decided to re-evaluate our nation’s policies and national security interests. In an address to the joint session of Congress and the American People on September 20, 2001, the President said the following:

“Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” (emphasis added in bold throughout)

Sometime after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin handed over intelligence to the Bush administration that reportedly showed an Iraqi regime effort to prepare terrorist attacks against the United States. While it apparently did not reveal anything new to our intelligence agencies, it did confirm what we had already known about Iraq – that terrorism was practiced and supported by the Saddam Hussein regime.

On October 7, 2001, a successful campaign known as Operation Enduring Freedom was underway in Afghanistan to eliminate the oppressive Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization that was harbored there. Once progress became noticeable many leaders in Congress and in the Administration began calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

In a letter to the president on December 5, 2001, nine leaders of Congress from both major parties called for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In this letter, they stated the following:

“The events of September 11 have highlighted the vulnerability of the United States to determined terrorists. As we work to clean up Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda, it is imperative that we plan to eliminate the threat from Iraq.”

“The threat from Iraq is real, and it cannot be permanently contained. For as long as Saddam Hussein is in power in Baghdad, he will seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. We have no doubt that these deadly weapons are intended for use against the United States and its allies. Consequently, we believe we must directly confront Saddam, sooner rather than later. Without allies on the ground inside Iraq, we will be handicapping our own efforts.”

“Mr. President, all indications are that in the interest of our own national security, Saddam Hussein must be removed from power.”

Prepared testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, on February 6, 2002, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence outlined some of the threats Iraq posed. In his prepared statements, Tenet summarized what he had learned over several years as the Agency’s Director. He was straightforward when stating:

“Let me be clear: Saddam remains a threat. He is determined to thwart UN sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf War.”

Those are the words from the top intelligence official in our government. And after making references to Iraq’s support for terrorism and Saddam’s chemical and biological programs and capabilities, Tenet said, “We believe Saddam never abandoned his nuclear weapons program…our major near-term concern is the possibility that Saddam might gain access to fissile material.”

Even former Vice President and fierce opponent of George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election, Al Gore, made public his thoughts about confronting Saddam Hussein. These are some of his remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations on February 12, 2002:

“Even if we give first priority to the destruction of terrorist networks, and even if we succeed, there are still governments that could bring us great harm. And there is a clear case that one of these governments in particular represents a virulent threat in a class by itself: Iraq.”

“As far as I am concerned, a final reckoning with that government should be on the table. To my way of thinking, the real question is not the principle of the thing, but of making sure that this time we will finish the matter on our terms.”

The British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) published their assessment of Iraq’s WMD in September 2002. In the foreword of this document, known as the “September Dossier”, Prime Minister Tony Blair declares his confidence in the intelligence gathered by stating he and other British Ministers “have been briefed in detail on the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority.” The Prime Minister also goes on to briefly describe what has happened and what ought to happen:

“The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act.”

Among the intelligence in this dossier was a comprehensive assessment of the Saddam Hussein regime’s past chemical, biological, and nuclear programs, the programs rebuilt or maintained since UN inspectors were last in Iraq, UN inspection programs and their effectiveness against the regime’s deceptions and defiance, and the history of Saddam’s human rights abuses. While it did not definitively conclude that Iraq had nuclear weapons, the intelligence agencies did specify “that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.” According to their assessment, Iraq was in fact seeking to obtain those materials.

The first major speech given by President Bush to international leaders and the American public regarding the enforcement of UNSC resolutions occurred on September 12, 2002. The president presented his argument to the delegates of the UN General Assembly in which he outlined why Saddam Hussein must be confronted and previous resolutions must be obeyed. Here are some of those remarks:

“Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped - by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.”

“To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.”

“He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge - by his deceptions, and by his cruelties – Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.”

After mentioning twelve resolutions passed since the ceasefire agreement that dealt with weapons programs and inspections, the president explained why additional resolutions would not suffice.

“We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.”

“The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”

President Bush then gave a list of demands the Iraqi regime must comply with in order to keep the peace and to be in compliance with UNSC resolutions. He also made clear what the consequences would be if they failed to meet those demands:

“My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced - the just demands of peace and security will be met – or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.”

In the most important speech about Iraq to date, and in the first major public appeal to international leaders, the president neither mentioned a Saddam Hussein/September 11th connection, nor did he say Iraq definitively had stockpiles of WMD. There was only one mention of stockpiles when he said, “United Nations’ inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard, and other chemical agents…”

The overall assessment of the intelligence agencies and the general message of President Bush’s UN speech was that Iraq was trying to reconstitute its WMD programs, that Iraq had not sufficiently disclosed its past weapons and programs in violation of UNSC resolutions, that the Saddam Hussein regime had used these weapons in the past, that there were connections to terrorist organizations, and that Iraq had shown a willingness to defy the international community repeatedly and with little concern. It was this combination that paved the way for Iraq to be considered a serious threat and for the United States to take action to either enforce the UNSC resolutions or to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Making the Case to America

Near the beginning of October 2002, the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations conducted a poll of Americans. Their poll showed that approximately 62% of Americans supported military action to remove Saddam from power. Among the supporters for military action, 60% cited terrorism and the Iraqi military threat as their reason for support, and another 25% specifically cited Saddam Hussein. Among those opposed, only 10% felt that there was not enough proof to justify war while another 9% did not believe preemption was a good strategy. The largest portion of opposition, about 24%, thought military and civilian casualties were not worth the fight.

With support for removing Saddam Hussein being fairly consistent for several months, President Bush addressed the nation on October 7, 2002. In this television address, the president conveyed a strong message – one that highlighted a steady record of Iraqi non-compliance of UN resolutions and a substantial amount of intelligence that documented Iraq’s weapons programs, use of those weapons, and ties to terrorism. President Bush’s intentions were clear and he put the United Nations and Saddam Hussein on notice with these words:

“The time for denying, deceiving, and delaying has come to an end. Saddam Hussein must disarm himself - or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

“…America is challenging all nations to take the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council seriously. Those resolutions are very clear. In addition to declaring and destroying all of its weapons of mass destruction, Iraq must end its support for terrorism. It must cease the persecution of its civilian population. It must stop all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. And it must release or account for all Gulf War personnel, including an American pilot, whose fate is still unknown.”

“By taking these steps, and only by taking these steps, the Iraqi regime has an opportunity to avoid conflict…Failure to act would embolden other tyrants; allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources; and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events. The United Nations would betray the purpose of its founding, and prove irrelevant to the problems of our time.”

“I have asked Congress to authorize the use of America's military, if it proves necessary, to enforce U.N. Security Council demands…The resolution will tell the United Nations, and all nations, that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something. Congress will also be sending a message to the dictator in Iraq: that his only choice is full compliance - and the time remaining for that choice is limited.”

Again, in a major public address – this time making his case directly to the American People – the president makes no mention of a Saddam/September 11th connection, and there is only one mention of “stockpiles.” Once again, this mention is also referring to what was discovered by UN inspectors.

Even staunch opponents of President Bush found the threat of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime to be credible and the situation problematic. Democrat Representative Henry Waxman made these remarks regarding possible war with Iraq three days after the president’s address to the nation:

“…if the UN does not act, it not only leaves Saddam unchecked but it undermines, perhaps fatally, the purpose of having or supporting a UN in the first place…Although I disagree deeply with much of President Bush’s domestic policies and some aspects of his foreign policy, I agree with his conclusion that we cannot leave Saddam to continue on his present course…Despite my misgivings about the President’s approach, I believe it’s essential that Congress send the strongest bipartisan signal of unity possible so the UN will act.”

“In a post September 11 world, it is important we speak with one voice and send one message - particularly when the lives of our men and women in the armed forces are at stake. And it is important that we not send a confused signal to Iraq, so that there be no doubt about our resolve.”

On October 16, 2002, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. This is the official public record of why we went to war in Iraq. The twenty-three clauses created and adopted in this document represent the official will of the People, was passed by our representatives in Congress, and was signed into law by the president. It was passed by a vote of 296 to 133 in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, and by a vote of 77 to 23 in the Democrat-controlled Senate. This resolution, according to Section 3, was specifically created to give authorization to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”

Of the twenty-three “whereas” clauses in this document, which outlined the government’s official reasons for authorizing military force, nine referenced UNSC resolutions and enforcing them, five had to do with national security and national defense, five more mentioned terrorism and our war to combat it, one referenced past Iraqi regime use of WMD, one brought up the failed assassination attempt against George H. W. Bush and continual firing on the U.S. and Coalition Armed Forces, one mentioned regime change as public policy of the United States, and one had to do with an intelligence “discovery” of Iraqi WMD capabilities and possession after the first Gulf War.

Only two of these clauses contained the word “stockpiles” but neither was solely created for the purpose of addressing stockpiles. They were simply mentioned as one part of the overall clause. When viewed, the resolution’s “whereas” clauses are mostly in a working order where the previous clause qualifies the following one. The first of these two clauses immediately follows the clause that mentions the cease-fire agreement from 1991, and only uses the term “stockpiles” when referring to chemical weapons. However, this clause describes what was discovered in Iraq after the First Gulf War. It was not a description of what was in Iraq in 2002; it was an example of what could happen, and what did happen when inspectors were deceived and prevented from accounting for weapons and weapon programs. The clause is written as follows:

“Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated.”

Part Two of the September Dossier supports these claims and this is exactly what was mentioned in President Bush’s television address the week before when he said the following:

“In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for…We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents…”

Later in the address, he described what was discovered about Iraq’s nuclear program:

“Before the Gulf War, the best intelligence indicated that Iraq was eight to ten years away from developing a nuclear weapon; after the war, international inspectors learned that the regime had been much closer. The regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. The inspectors discovered that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a workable nuclear weapon, and was pursuing several different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.”

The second clause isn’t as dramatic. It merely mentions the fact that Iraq possessed stockpiles in the past, but inspectors were not able to identify them because of Iraqi non-compliance. It had more to do with the fact that inspectors had not been able to do their job both in the past and at that point in time. Here is that clause:

“Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998”

So of the twenty-three clauses, only two referenced “stockpiles”, but neither could have been construed as one of the official reasons for war by itself. Even if one was to incorrectly infer that the first clause mentioned above was specifically about current stockpiles, one could not disregard the fact that the term “stockpiles” was only addressing the supply of chemical weapons, not all WMD.

Knowing that the authorization to use our military to enforce UNSC resolutions or remove Saddam Hussein from power was contingent on trying to use diplomacy first, President Bush took the issue back to the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to get the Council to enforce their own demands. Sixteen previous resolutions since the Gulf War, in addition to the eleven prior to it, had proven inadequate in dealing with the Iraqi regime. The president had congressional authorization to remove Saddam with or without the support of the Security Council, but diplomacy was required first, so the effort was made.

Convincing the Council to Enforce its Demands

After the joint resolution from Congress was passed, a CBS/New York Times poll conducted on October 27 – 31, 2002 showed that 64% of Americans supported using military force to remove Saddam Hussein. This number had actually fallen three percentage points since three weeks prior and was two points lower than in August. When asked if they thought President Bush was working with the UN, 64% of respondents believed that he was. The following week, the UN Security Council voted on their latest resolution condemning Iraq.

At the 4644th meeting of the United Nations Security Council on November 8, 2002, the Council unanimously passed (by a vote of 15 – 0) Resolution 1441. These are some of the key elements of that resolution:

“The Security Council,

Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance…poses to international peace and security,

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687…

Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with resolution 687…

Recalling that in its resolution 687…a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations…

Decides…to afford Iraq…a final opportunity to comply…

Decides that, in order to begin to comply…Iraq shall provide…not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes…

Decides that false statements or omissions…shall constitute a further material breach…

Requests the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq…and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively…

Recalls…that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations…”

Since this new resolution was unanimously passed by the Security Council, all permanent members had to agree to it knowing that the United States had already passed the authorization to use military force and that the president made his intentions clear if the Council refused to enforce this, or any previous resolution. The words above were unambiguous and the consequences of non-compliance were made evident. The United Nations indeed faced irrelevance if they now failed to act on these warnings. With that in mind, Iraq pledged to comply and the inspectors resumed their duties in late November, after a four-year hiatus.

On January 27, 2003, Dr. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) gave an update to the Security Council on inspections regarding Iraq’s disarmament. In this report, Dr. Blix discussed relevant issues involving Iraqi cooperation and what should be expected from the Iraqi government. His findings on that day demonstrated that while Iraq was complying with some of the UN demands, they were not making an “active” effort to disclose all information concerning WMD programs and materials. Here are a few of the remarks from Dr. Blix:

“Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.”

Dr. Blix also had a few questions about WMD that he felt were important and had not been adequately answered to date.

“One of three important questions before us today is how much might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991…what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when inspectors left; and…how can it be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future.”

Dr. Blix went on to describe a reluctance to cooperate - including some harassment by Iraqi officials, and after this next statement about Iraq’s declaration on December 7, 2002, he continued to demonstrate discrepancies that still remain unresolved:

“Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq’s letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.”

The next night, President Bush delivered his 2003 State of the Union Address. In it, he discussed Iraq and the responsibilities the Iraqi regime needed to accept in order to fulfill its international obligations:

“We have called on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demands that Iraq disarm…Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction…Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons – not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities…It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened.”

Some of the same discrepancies outlined by Dr. Blix, as well as others, were mentioned by the president in his address:

“The United Nations concluded…that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax…that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin…Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent…that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents…”

“He’s not accounted for these materials…these prohibited munitions. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them.”

After President Bush spoke briefly about Iraqi terrorist connections he stated the following:

“Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent…Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option…The world has waited twelve years for Iraq to disarm…If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”

In yet another public speech to the American People, a speech which can be seen, heard, or read around the world, President Bush did not mention any known stockpiles or an Iraqi regime connection to September 11, 2001. However, he once again explained the past Iraqi attempts to retain and develop WMD and their continued defiance in disclosing those activities, as well as the threat that remained as a result of terrorist acquisition of such weapons and the relationship of the Iraqi regime with those organizations.

The following week, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council. In this February 5th presentation, Secretary Powell discussed further Iraqi intentions to deceive UN inspectors and their history of weapons capabilities, as well as what was expected by the Council. He opened his presentation with these words:

“Last November 8, this council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote…Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party…Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply…This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.”

In the next hour and fifteen minutes, the Secretary went into some details about recent Iraqi efforts and activities.

“…let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq submitted to this council on December 7…Iraq planned to use the declaration to overwhelm us and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about Iraq’s permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursue Iraq’s prohibited weapons…My colleagues, operative paragraph four of U.N. Resolution 1441, which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false statements and omissions in the declaration…shall constitute a further material breach of its obligation. We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test…They failed that test…Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in U.N. Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.”

“We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged permitted ballistic missiles…violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this council in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems…Their import was illegal on three counts. Resolution 687 prohibited all military shipments into Iraq. UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in surface-to-surface missiles. And finally…they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit. Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December – after this council passed Resolution 1441.”

“Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAV’s…According to Iraq’s December 7 declaration, its UAV’s have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAV’s in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot…Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq’s December 7th declaration…its 80 kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers unrefueled and on autopilot, violative of all of its obligations under 1441.”

“Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons. It's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world…Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants…Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries, including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia.”

“When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past, we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting a more frightening future…Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein’s dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and to his neighbors…My colleagues, over three months ago this council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of this council.”

On March 10, 2003, French President Jacques Chirac made it clear that he would not support any new U.N. resolution that demanded both full and immediate cooperation from Iraq, or face a coalition force to remove Saddam Hussein. Despite admitting that Iraq was not “sufficiently cooperative,” the French president opposed using force to ensure compliance. With this announcement he ultimately rendered a vote on a new resolution irrelevant. Since France had veto power as a permanent member of the Council, the requisite nine votes for passage would have been inconsequential. Chirac effectively defeated the resolution without a single vote being cast. Just hours before this announcement, the Russian Foreign Minister stated that Russia did not think a new resolution was necessary. China had also previously made it known to the Council that war was to be avoided until every other effort was exhausted. This allowed other nations like Germany and Pakistan to publicly express their opposition to enforcement of Resolution 1441 or any new call for Iraq to meet its previous obligations under the threat of inevitable international force.

In essence, the UNSC had decided that their previous demands for Iraqi compliance and threats of “serious consequences” were not to be taken seriously. By the actions of members in the Security Council, their words were to ring hollow and the body was to become irrelevant.

A Final Decision

While the Bush administration was trying to convince the international community of the dangers posed by Iraq, DCI George Tenet was again addressing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. On February 11, 2003, he made another appearance in front of the committee to discuss terrorism and proliferation. He spoke about our successes in confronting international terrorist organizations and also the concerns about terrorists’ determination to acquire WMD and inflict severe damage.

“The overwhelming disparity between U.S. forces and those of any potential rival drives terrorist adversaries to the extremes of warfare – toward ‘the suicide bomber or the nuclear device’ as the best ways to confront the United States. Our adversaries see us as lacking will and determination when confronted with the prospect of massive losses.”

With the threat of war on the horizon, the perspective of our adversaries would seemingly prove true in their eyes when in the following month, France, Russia, China, and Germany would abandon the prospect of any enforcement measures against Iraq. Director Tenet addressed the situation in Iraq and reminded the Senate Committee of Iraqi activity and defiance.

“Iraq has in place an active effort to deceive UN inspectors and deny them access…Iraq has recently flight tested missiles that violate the UN range limit of 150 kilometers…Iraq has tested unmanned aerial vehicles to ranges that far exceed both what it declared to the United Nations and what it is permitted under UN resolutions…Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi…”

As it became clear that Saddam Hussein still had no intentions of being fully cooperative as demanded by UNSC Resolution 1441, and that the Council members who had voted to give him “a final opportunity to comply” or “face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations” had no intention of holding him to those demands, President Bush gave a final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and braced the United States and the world for “a final reckoning with that government” – as Al Gore had so eloquently stated over one year prior.

On the day that the president would issue his final public message to Saddam Hussein – March 17, 2003 – a Washington Post/ABC News poll found that 70% supported going to war with Iraq with 54% strongly supporting it. Only 19% strongly opposed war. A clear majority, over 58% said they would support removing Saddam Hussein from power even without the support of the United Nations. When respondents were asked if they supported the Bush administration’s decision to not conduct another Security Council vote for war in Iraq, 66% said they supported that decision. The American public was behind their president and the Commander-in-Chief was finally prepared to act.

In one last effort to avoid war, President Bush gave his final pre-war television address to the nation on March 17, 2003. Since diplomacy had failed and it was realized that enforcement of UNSC resolutions was not to come from the very council members that passed those resolutions, the president offered Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to escape the consequences of his actions. These words were ultimately the defining moment of Saddam Hussein’s future legacy:

“The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security.”

“On November 8th, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and immediately disarm. Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council’s long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it.”

“The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours. In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They have delivered public and private messages urging the dictator to leave Iraq, so that disarmament can proceed peacefully. He has thus far refused. All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing…It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power.”

“We are now acting because the risk of inaction would be far greater…The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities…In this century, when evil men plot, chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth. Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations – and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide.”

Once again, there’s no mention of stockpiles or a September 11th connection. As fate would have it, Saddam Hussein did not heed the warning of President Bush, so the president’s next address to the nation would come two days later – at 10:16pm – to announce the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As required by the authorization resolution from the previous October, President Bush gave to Congress his Report In Connection With Presidential Determination. Just like every other major speech or television address, there is no claim in this official document of current “stockpiles” or a connection linking Saddam Hussein with the terrorist acts on September 11th, 2001. There are however, many key elements in this report worth noting:

“Indeed, as Congress found when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), Iraq continues to harbor and aid international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the safety of United States citizens. The use of military force to remove the Iraqi regime is therefore not only consistent with, but is a vital part of, the international war on terrorism.”

“On April 3, 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, which established conditions for a cease-fire to suspend hostilities…On April 6, 1991, Iraq communicated to the UNSC its acceptance of the conditions for the cease-fire…For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has deceived and defied the will and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by, among other things: continuing to seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and prohibited long-range missiles; brutalizing the Iraqi people, including committing gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity; supporting international terrorism; refusing to release or account for prisoners of war and other missing individuals from the Gulf War era; refusing to return stolen Kuwaiti property; and working to circumvent the UN’s economic sanctions.”

“The UNSC declared that Iraq ‘has been and remains in material breach’ of its disarmament obligations, but chose to afford Iraq one ‘final opportunity’ to comply…Rather than seizing this final opportunity for a peaceful solution by giving full and immediate cooperation, the Hussein regime responded with renewed defiance and deception…In a report dated March 6, 2003, UNMOVIC described over 600 instances in which Iraq had failed to declare fully activities related to its chemical, biological, or missile procurements.”

“Despite the continued resistance by Iraq, the United States has continued to use diplomatic and other peaceful means to achieve complete and total disarmament that would adequately protect the national security of the United States from the threat posed by Iraq and which is required by all relevant UNSC resolutions…Further diplomatic efforts were suspended reluctantly after, as the President observed on March 17, ‘some permanent members of the Security Council had publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq.’”

“The Council authorized the use of force in UNSCR 678 with respect to Iraq in 1990. This resolution – on which the United States has relied continuously and with the full knowledge of the UNSC to use force in 1993, 1996, and 1998 and to enforce the no-fly zones – remains in effect today…And, of course…the United States may always proceed in the exercise of its inherent right of self defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the United States has clear authority to use military force against Iraq to assure its national security and to compel Iraq’s compliance with applicable UNSC resolutions.”

Without the support of our more contemporary allies and one long-standing ally in particular (France), the United States and a coalition including the U.K., Australia, Poland, Denmark, and over 40 other nations began the campaign to finally remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. United States Public Laws 105-338 and 107-243 were enacted and seventeen previously breached UNSC resolutions were enforced. More importantly, twenty-four years of tyranny came to an end.

In My Own Words

Why are we in Iraq?

Despite what most of the opponents to the Iraq War believe, the war was not all about “stockpiles” and Al-Qaeda. In fact, even though no stockpiles were found and there was no indication of a collaborative operational link between the Iraqi regime and Al-Qaeda, it was still the right decision to make both as a means to promote national and international security and as an enforcement mechanism for the UNSC. Let’s take a look at the facts:

We know that the Iraqi government was not in compliance with seventeen UNSC resolutions and was still actively deceiving inspectors until the time they left in March 2003.

We know that the Iraqi government was purchasing illegal weapons and materials even after Resolution 1441 was passed. Many of these illicit deals were made with permanent Security Council member nations.

We know that the Iraqi government was carrying out their own acts of terrorism and also supporting and harboring other terrorists and terrorist organizations, including groups that were known to be close associates with Al-Qaeda.

We know about the policy of torture and execution of dissidents perpetrated on the orders of Saddam Hussein and we also know about the chemical weapons he used against Iranians and his own civilian population, as well as other human rights violations.

We know that Saddam Hussein was able to corrupt the Oil-For-Food (OFF) program in which the additional revenue would have eventually rendered the UN sanctions obsolete. Some of the nations complicit in this corruption were members of the Security Council and the goal of Saddam was to use them in order to induce the lifting of sanctions.

We know that chemical munitions were found both before and after the war began even though the Iraqi government claimed that all such munitions were unilaterally destroyed in the 1990’s.

We know that documents were altered and that munitions were moved immediately prior to UN inspections before the war.

All of the above reasons should have been enough to remove Saddam Hussein from power. If we add the fact that we weren’t sure if he had any WMD capabilities or that he may try to reach out to Al-Qaeda, it would certainly be irresponsible to not act accordingly. Just because there were not caches of WMD and he didn’t maintain a direct operational link to Al-Qaeda, it did not mean that everything was fine and he should have been allowed to continue with his long-term objectives.

The war was never about what we were sure Iraq had. It was about the actions that we observed, not knowing what they had, and not being able to take the risk of allowing the secrecy, deception, and defiance to continue. Iraq violated international peace and security and they never made the effort to reassure the international community that it wouldn’t happen again. Furthermore, what many people need to understand, and what most fail to realize, is that the evidence the public sees is not the entire body of intelligence that our agencies collect. In many instances, publicly revealing the intelligence that we have gathered will undermine our capabilities and expose the means we have to obtain that information. There are some things about Iraq that we may never know, but that doesn’t mean they never happened.

Since the war began, we have found evidence of further Iraqi deception and removal or “cleaning” of dual-use materials and facilities. There have also been findings regarding Saddam Hussein’s intentions and his short-term goals, which involved lifting UN sanctions and reconstituting his WMD programs. Much of this information can be found in the Duelfer Report. In addition, reports from UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirm that banned materials were shipped out of Iraq before, during, and after the war began. And just recently, ABC News obtained a document released from the Institute For Defense Analyses which contains evidence that the Saddam Hussein regime performed acts of terrorism and was thoroughly involved with other terrorist organizations, including ones closely associated with Al-Qaeda.

Another criticism of the war by the opponents is that President Bush was not forthright with his plans – that he had discussed removing Saddam Hussein long before the September 11th attacks. Even if the president did have plans to replace the Iraqi regime, it would have been acceptable in accordance with U.S. Public Law 105-338, which was adopted in 1998 by the previous administration and Congress. Furthermore, in February of 2001, a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll showed that 52% of Americans were in favor of “sending American ground troops to the Persian Gulf in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power.” Seven months before the September 11th terrorist attacks the American public favored regime change by force in Iraq. At no time before the war was there a majority of Americans that opposed the removal of Saddam Hussein.

Many anti-war activists also claim that the Iraq War is illegal or a “war of aggression” and therefore violates the UN Charter. These allegations are not grounded in fact or logic, but they have become the mantra of the opponents of the Iraq War, and almost any other war for that matter.

First of all, the UN definition of a “war of aggression” basically labels any action, aside from immediate self-defense from an attack, as aggression. The definition is all-encompassing and it does not take into account individual circumstances; it leaves that determination entirely up to the UN. Here is one of the key elements of Resolution 3314, which defines a war of aggression:

“No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.”

This interpretation leaves no room for just cause, and since only the UN determines what constitutes aggression it leaves little room for a nation’s sovereign decision-making. Even if the first action is in response to a credible threat, according to the UN it could still constitute “prima facie evidence of an act of aggression”. However, since the UN decides on all matters, they may take relevant evidence into consideration and rule that a first act isn’t necessarily aggression. In any case, the definition is not binding in international law or on the Security Council and it was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote.

The second aspect of the legality argument rests within constitutional law. Some will argue that the Congress does not have the authority to delegate to the president the decision to go to war and that by going to war it violated the UN Charter and therefore, our constitution. Both arguments are incorrect. The Congress, by giving the president the authority to use military force, made a de facto declaration that war is acceptable if certain conditions are met. Over 370 members of Congress decided what those terms were and what the president had to do in order to fulfill the required obligations. The “Report in Connection with Presidential Determination” fulfilled those requirements. The Congress did not reject that report and has not passed any new law that would repeal the use of force or withdraw the military or their funding. For all intents and purposes, and by any legal definition, the war in Iraq is constitutional.

On February 13, 2003, a lawsuit was filed by a few members of the United States military, their family members, and by several congressmen in the House of Representatives against President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The plaintiffs argued that the Congress unconstitutionally delegated its power to declare war to the president and that the president is acting in violation of the resolution authorizing force. The district court in Massachusetts dismissed this case, Doe v. Bush, on February 24, 2003 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed it again on March 13, 2003. In the written decision from the Court of Appeals, the judges made the following findings:

“The Constitution explicitly divides the various war powers between the political branches…Given this ‘amalgam of powers’ the Constitution overall ‘envisages the joint participation of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and duration of hostilities’…It is therefore an error of considerable significance to adopt uncritically an ‘either/or’ logic – to assume that the doctrine of separation of powers requires that power must be either in, and only in, congress or the president. Such a rigid, mechanical view has never accurately described the relationship between congress and the presidency even with respect to internal affairs; it is wholly insupportable in the area of foreign affairs. The fact is that power may inhere in both.”

“The mere fact that the October Resolution grants some discretion to the President fails to raise a sufficiently clear constitutional issue…Nor is there clear evidence of congressional abandonment of the authority to declare war to the President…the text of the October Resolution itself spells out justifications for a war and frames itself as an ‘authorization’ of such a war…As the circumstances presented here do not warrant judicial intervention, the appropriate recourse for those who oppose war with Iraq lies with the political branches.”

The court affirmed the previous dismissal because there was no legitimate claim that the resolution authorizing force was somehow circumventing constitutional law or that the president was using the authorization against the will of Congress. The Democrats that signed on to the lawsuit had already been defeated by a vote in the House of Representatives. Their actions in this case seemed to be little more than political partisanship and perhaps playing the role of sore losers. These are the House members that filed as plaintiffs: John Conyers (D), Dennis Kucinich (D), Jesse Jackson Jr. (D), Sheila Jackson Lee (D), Jim McDermott (D), Jose E. Serrano (D), Danny K. Davis (D), Maurice D. Hinchey (D), Carolyn Kilpatrick (D), Pete Stark (D), Diane Watson (D), and Lynn C. Woolsey (D).

The argument that by going to war in Iraq, the United States violated the UN Charter is equally as questionable. Article 51 of the Charter specifies that it shall not “impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” of any member nations. Chapter I, Article 1 of the Charter also states in the very first line, “The Purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace and security…” In UNSC Resolution 1441, the phrase, “international peace and security” – and the notion that Iraq threatens it and it needs to be restored – is mentioned four times, yet the Council never acted to restore it. Also in Article 1, the Charter claims to respect the concept of self-determination, human rights, and “fundamental freedoms for all”. However, in the case regarding Iraq, the UN repeatedly failed to defend all three principles.

So, the United States – acting in accordance with the right to self-defense against a legitimate threat to international peace and security, which was repeatedly recognized by the Council – decided to remove the dictator that fomented hostilities and tension in the region and also deprived his people of fundamental rights that the UN was created to protect. In addition, we were also upholding the very principles of our Constitution and the document that ultimately led to its creation and the basis of the UN Charter…the Declaration of Independence.

To make a long story short, there was nothing illegal about removing Saddam Hussein from power and enforcing UNSC resolutions. It was constitutional and was done in accordance with the UN Charter. The only nations that should be ashamed and whose intentions should be called into question are the ones that failed to uphold the Charter and the Security Council resolutions to which they agreed.

Some opponents to the war have argued that the president and his administration “rushed to war.” All one needs to do is look at the history of the Iraq saga and realize that those claims are preposterous. Many people don’t realize or don’t care to understand the efforts we made to avoid war with the Iraqi regime. Here’s a reminder of what we endured before finally taking action:

Over two decades of WMD development, possession, and use.
Over two decades of terrorism, harboring and funding terrorists, and other connections to terrorist organizations.
Over two decades of human rights violations, including use of chemical weapons on Iraqi citizens.
Two invasions of sovereign nations in two decades.
Over 12 years of UNSC defiance and seventeen resolutions without direct confrontation.
Over four and a half years after regime change in Iraq was made a policy by U.S. Public Law.
Over four years of secrecy and deception after inspectors were kicked out by Saddam Hussein.
One year had passed after the attacks on September 11, 2001 before making a case to the UN.
Six months passed after making that case and making clear our intentions.
Five months passed after the authorization of force was given to the president by Congress.
Four months after Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply or face “serious consequences.”
Forty-eight hours before OIF began, the president even told Saddam Hussein he and his sons could leave Iraq and spare their lives and spare his country from the hardships of war.

There certainly was not a rush to war. That’s just empty political rhetoric. Confrontation was already delayed for far too long and we had too much to lose by waiting for enforcement from the Security Council, which may have never happened.

President Bush knew we would not get the support we desired. The intent of Saddam Hussein was to pit UNSC members against each other. He knew he could corrupt the OFF program and use it to make deals with member nations that would then push for the lifting or suspension of UN sanctions – which was Saddam’s short-term goal. France and Russia were complicit in this scheme. They were never going to support an operation that removed the Iraqi government. They had millions of dollars worth of oil contracts that would have been redeemed when sanctions halted and they were also supplying Iraq with military equipment – against the will of the resolutions created by the UNSC, of which they are permanent members. It’s no surprise that they were so opposed to removing Saddam…he was a lucrative business partner to them.

At the very least, France, Russia, and possibly China ought to be expelled from the Security Council for their violations of SC resolutions against a sanctioned government, attempting to undermine sanctions imposed by the Council, and their willingness to participate in the corruption of a UN humanitarian program which nearly rendered sanctions obsolete – all three in violation of Chapter 1, Article 2, Clause 5 of the UN Charter.

The facts are clear; history has been recorded and it will not change. We were given the reasons for war and we asked for support from the UN and our allies. This was not a numbers game. It was never just an issue of Saddam having x number of weapons that could kill x amount of people. It was about a choice given to a brutal and murderous dictator whose aspirations were abundantly clear. He chose – and we responded.

Anyone who claims this war was illegal, that it was a “war of aggression”, that the administration lied to or misled the public, or that our intentions were anything other than what was articulated to our citizens and to the world, clearly does not possess the ability to comprehend the facts. They may choose to distort them and they may choose to wallow in their own stubbornness or stupidity, but they will not succeed in changing the historical record. Future generations will know that these people turned their back on the fight against tyranny and oppression. They will know that these people had forsaken their president and these inherent inalienable rights of people in all cultures: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The blood of every Iraqi military casualty, every Iraqi citizen casualty, and every casualty of the coalition forces is on the hands of Saddam Hussein. He was given a second chance in 1991 when we chose not to remove him from power during the Gulf War. He promised to comply with UN demands. He was given a third chance in the fall of 2002 when the UNSC passed Resolution 1441 demanding compliance with severe consequences if he refused. He was even given a fourth chance on March 17, 2003, when President Bush told him to leave his country to avoid war. He squandered every one of those chances and paid the ultimate price for his indiscretions.

Saddam Hussein was not to be trusted, he was dangerous, and he was willing to do and say anything to get the sanctions lifted and reconstitute his WMD programs in order to achieve his goal of an Arab super-state that dominated the Middle East. These facts were recognized by everyone, yet he was only confronted by a few. The Adolf Hitlers, Josef Stalins, Mao Tse Tungs, Pol Pots, and Saddam Husseins of the world are supposed to be dealt with before they carry out their tyranny. This was supposed to be the goal of the United Nations.

Nevertheless, the UN and the rest of the world has continually failed to accomplish this goal, but future generations will know that the United States and our coalition of a chosen few ended the career of one despot on our terms – before his ultimate goal had a chance to be realized.

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