jkizmo2007's Xomblurbs

Aerial combat or dogfights emerged in World War I. Bi-plaine and tri-planes were initially used as mobile observation vehicles and early pilots gave little thought to aerial combat- before enemy pilots simply exchanged waves. Intrepid pilots decided to interfere with enemy reconnaissance by using anything to put the plane down. This progressed to pilots firing hand-held guns at enemy planes. Once machine guns were mounted to the plane, either on a flexible mounting or higher on the wings of early biplanes, the era of air combat began. The Germans acquired an early air superiority due to the invention of synchronization gear in 1915.

During the first part of the war, there was no established tactical doctrine for air-to-air combat. Oswald Boelcke was the first to analyze the tactics of aerial warfare, resulting in a set of rules known as the Dicta Boelcke. Many of Boelcke's concepts, conceived in 1916, are still applicable today, including use of sun and altitude, surprise attack, and turning to meet a threat.

The Fokker time

In 1915, Anthony Fokker designed the interrupter gear, which turned the tide of war in Germany's favor. This ingenious device mechanically linked the gun to the propeller, stopping the fire when a propeller blade passed in front of the machinegun muzzle. This was first fitted in the spring of 1915 to the production prototypes of the Fokker Eindecker, known as the M.5K/MG, making it top-of-the-line in design, maneuverability (although the Eindecker used wing warping for roll control), and most importantly, gun placement. Leutnant Kurt Wintgens, on July 1, 1915, scored the earliest known victory for a synchronized gun-equipped fighter with his M.5K/MG over a two-seat Morane Saulnier Parasol near Luneville, France. The result was devastating for the Allied powers, and gave the Germans almost total control of the air. Soon Allied planes were forced to flee for home at the mere sight of German monoplanes. A solution was needed, and quickly.

The E.III's foil came in the form of the Nieuport 11, a tractor biplane and, as needed, a cowl gun. The key event which allowed the Allies to reverse-engineer the German technology occurred when a German pilot became lost in heavy fog over France. The pilot and plane were captured when it landed, giving the Allies access to its technology.

Another plane contributing to the end of the Fokker Scourge was the British pusher Airco DH.2. It suffered from mechanical reliability problems, but was far superior to the E.III.

The Fokker E-III, Airco DH-2, and Nieuport 11 would be the first in a long line of fighter aircraft used by both sides during the war. Fighters were primarily used to shoot down enemy planes, mainly the two-seaters used for reconnaissance and bombing missions. Because of this, another key role of fighter planes was to protect their own two-seaters from enemy fighters while they carried out their mission. Fighters were also used to attack ground targets with small loads of bombs and by strafing.

Bloody April

In April 1917, the Allies launched a joint offensive, the British attacking near Arras in Artois, while the French Nivelle Offensive was launched on the Aisne. Air forces were called on to provide support, predominantly in reconnaissance and artillery spotting.

However, the Germans were prepared for the offensive, and were equipped with the new Albatros D-III, "the best fighting scout on the Western Front"[8] at the time.

The month became known as Bloody April by the Allied air forces. The Royal Flying Corps suffered particularly severe losses. However, they managed to keep the German Air Force on the defensive, largely preventing them from using their planes on bombing or reconnaissance missions to assist their troops on the ground.

Shortly after "Bloody April", the Allies re-equipped their squadrons with new planes such as the Sopwith Pup, and S.E.5a which helped tip the balance back in their favor. The Germans responded with new types as well, such as the Fokker Dr.I, which were in turn countered by the British Sopwith Camel and French SPAD S.XIII. As a result, the Allies were able to maintain general air superiority toward the end of the year, which was in general maintained for the rest of the war.

the final years of war

The final year of the war (1918) saw increasing shortages of supplies on the side of the Central Powers. Captured Allied planes were scrounged for every available material, even to the point of draining the lubricants from damaged engines just to keep one more German plane flyable.

Manfred von Richthofen, the famed Red Baron credited with around 80 victories, was killed in April, possibly by an Australian anti-aircraft machinegunner (although Royal Air Force pilot Captain Arthur Roy Brown was officially credited), and the leadership of Jagdgeschwader 1 eventually passed to Hermann Göring.

Germany introduced the Fokker D.VII, both loved and loathed to the point surrender of all surviving examples was specifically ordered by the victorious Allies.

This year also saw the United States increasingly involved. While American volunteers had been flying in Allied squadrons since the early years of the war, not until 1918 did all-American squadrons begin patrolling the skies above the trenches. At first, the Americans were largely supplied with second-rate weapons and obsolete planes, such as the Nieuport 28. As American numbers grew, equipment improved, including the SPAD S.XIII, one of the best French planes in the war.
Aces of World War IAces of World War I

It is in the root of Japanese warriors the code of samurai called Bushido, that surrender is a disgrace and to die in the battlefield is a great honor. The act of giving your life for the service of the country, loveones, principles, beliefs and or faith is not new to the Japanese, their superb love and belief to their emperor is one factor that drives them to defy death in their respective duty. During the feudal period of Japan where Shoguns rule their lands, an act of fighting to death and not to surrender is part of their samurai code and it is noble and an honor. When the tides of the pacific war during World War II favored the Allies, it is instinct to all Japanese warriors to fight to death, to apply the samurai legacy.

Recruitment

The establishment of kamikaze forces required recruiting men for the task — this proved easier than the commanders had expected. Qualifications were simple: “youth, alertness and zeal. The youngest of kamikaze pilot of the Imperial army was 17 and the oldest was 35. Flight experience was of minimal importance and expertise in landing a luxury.” After all, these men were not really going to need to know how to land a plane if all they were meant to do was crash the plane into a carrier. Captain Motoharu Okamura commented that “there were so many volunteers for suicide missions that he referred to them as a swarm of bees, explaining: ‘Bees die after they have stung.’”

Most of those who had come from college came in what is called the Gakuto Shutsujin.

This was when the college students exemption from being drafted into the military was

lifted, and the graduation of the seniors was shifted from Aprill 1944 to September 1943.

Those who are involved in the Kamikaze program had been trained in/as one of the following:

The Youth Pilot training school, Candidates for Second Lieutenant, The Imperial Army Air Cops Academy, Pilot Trainee, Flight Officer Candidates, Special Flight Officer Probationary Cadet, Pilot Training Schools, or Special Flight Officer Candidate.

Article below is excerpt from research work of Mako Sasaki

Since the Kamikaze attacks were to be made only if the pilots had volunteered, and could not be commanded, there were two methods to collect volunteers. One was for all pilots in general, and another was for the Special Flight Officer Probationary Cadet ( College Graduates ) only. The former was an application form, and the latter was a survey. The survey asked: "Do you desire earnestly/wish/do not wish/to be involved in the kamikaze attacks?" They had to circle one of the three choices, or leave the paper blank. The important fact is that the pilots were required to sign their names. When the militatry had the absolute power, and the whole admosphere of Japan expected men to die for the country, there was great psychological pressure to circle "earnestly desire" or "wish". The army selected those had circled earnestly desire. The reason why the army preferred a survey for the college pilots, its because they believe they had known that students from college had a wider vision, and would not easily apply for such a mission. The army was confident that there would be many young pilots who would apply and they were right. Because there were so many volunteers, the military had decided to let the ones with better grades go first.

When the volunteers arrived for duty in the corps there were twice as many persons as aircraft. “After the war, some commanders would express regret for allowing superfluous crews to accompany sorties, sometimes squeezing themselves aboard bombers and fighters so as to encourage the suicide pilots and, it seems, join in the exultation of sinking a large enemy vessel.” Many of the Kamikaze believed their death would pay the debt they owed and show the love they had for their families, friends, and emperor. “So eager were many minimally trained pilots to take part in suicide missions that when their sorties were delayed or aborted, the pilots became deeply despondent. Many of those who were selected for a bodycrashing mission were described as being extraordinarily blissful immediately before their final sortie.”

Becoming a Kamikaze Pilot

Becoming a pilot in the Military during 1940s is a noble profession and indeed a popular profession compared to ordinary soldiers, the benefits and respect is greater. Japan air service (Army/Navy) in the advent of second World War had a lot of applicants ,in spite the fact that Imperial govt. was requiring every family to submit their sons to the military. Talented, bright young students preferred to become a pilot or naval officer and they really put their hearts to it.

Japanese pilots during early years of World War II were well-trained and well-equipped they have the superiority in the skies of the pacific.

The Japanese ace Saburo Sakai described how the resilience of early Allied aircraft was a factor in preventing the Zeros from total domination:

“ I had full confidence in my ability to destroy the Grumman and decided to finish off the enemy fighter with only my 7.7mm machine guns. I turned the 20mm. cannon switch to the 'off' position, and closed in. For some strange reason, even after I had poured about five or six hundred rounds of ammunition directly into the Grumman, the airplane did not fall, but kept on flying. I thought this very odd - it had never happened before - and closed the distance between the two airplanes until I could almost reach out and touch the Grumman. To my surprise, the Grumman's rudder and tail were torn to shreds, looking like an old torn piece of rag. With his plane in such condition, no wonder the pilot was unable to continue fighting! A Zero which had taken that many bullets would have been a ball of fire by now. ”

First Kamikaze Unit

Commander Asaiki Tamai asked a group of 23 talented student pilots, all of whom he had trained, to volunteer for the special attack force. All of the pilots raised both of their hands, thereby volunteering to join the operation. Later, Tamai asked Lt Yukio Seki to command the special attack force. Seki is said to have closed his eyes, lowered his head and thought for ten seconds, before saying: "please let me do that." Seki thereby became the 24th kamikaze pilot to be chosen. However, Seki later wrote: "Japan's future is bleak if it is forced to kill one of its best pilots. I am not going on this mission for the Emperor or for the Empire... I am going because I was ordered to." During his flight, his commanders heard him say "It is better to die, rather than to live as a coward."

The names of four sub-units within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi, and Unit Yamazakura. These names were taken from a patriotic poem (waka or tanka), "Shikishima no Yamato-gokoro wo hito towaba, asahi ni niou yamazakura bana" by the Japanese classical scholar, Motoori Norinaga. The poem reads:

“ If someone asks about the

Yamato spirit [Spirit of Old/True Japan] of Shikishima

[a poetic name for Japan] — it is the flowers of yamazakura [mountain cherry blossom ] that are fragrant in the Asahi [rising sun].

A less literal translation might read: "if someone asks about the spirit of old/true Japan, it is the flowers of mountain cherry blossom that are fragrant in the rising sun"

The peak in kamikaze attacks came during the period of April-June 1945, at the Battle of Okinawa. On April 6, 1945, waves of planes made hundreds of attacks in Operation Kikusui ("floating chrysanthemums"). At Okinawa, kamikaze attacks focused at first on Allied destroyers on picket duty, and then on the carriers in the middle of the fleet. Suicide attacks by planes or boats at Okinawa sank or put out of action at least 30 U.S. warships,and at least three U.S. merchant ships,along with some from other Allied forces. The attacks expended 1,465 planes. Many warships of all classes were damaged, some severely, but no aircraft carriers, battleships or cruisers were sunk by kamikaze at Okinawa. Most of the ships destroyed were destroyers or smaller vessels, especially those on picket duty.

U.S. aircraft carriers, with their wooden flight decks, were more vulnerable to kamikaze hits than the reinforced steel-decked carriers from the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) which operated in the theatre during 1945. The resilience of well-armoured vessels was shown on May 4. Just after 11:30, there was a wave of attacks against the BPF. One Japanese plane made a steep dive from "a great height" at the carrier HMS Formidable and was engaged by AA guns. The kamikaze was hit at close range but crashed into the flight deck, making a massive dent about 10 feet (three meters) long, two feet (0.6 m) wide and two feet deep in the armoured flight deck. A large steel splinter speared down through the hangar deck and the centre boiler-room, where it ruptured a steam line and came to rest in a fuel tank, starting a major fire in the aircraft park. Eight crew members were killed and 47 were wounded. One Corsair and 10 Grumman Avengers were destroyed. However, the fires were gradually brought under control, and the crater in the deck was repaired with concrete and steel plate. By 17:00, Corsairs were able to land. On May 8, Formidable was again damaged by a kamikaze, as was the carrier HMS Victorious and the battleship HMS Howe.

Sometimes twin-engined aircraft were used in planned kamikaze attacks. For example, Mitsubishi Ki-67 Hiryū ("Peggy") medium bombers, based on Formosa, undertook kamikaze attacks on Allied forces off Okinawa.

Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, the second in command of the Combined Pacific Fleet, directed the last official kamikaze attack, sending some Yokosuka D4Y Suisei "Judy" dive bombers from the 701st Air Group against the Allied fleet at Okinawa on August 15, 1945.

At least one kamikaze attack was made against land forces of the Soviet Red Army, on August 19, 1945, during Operation August Storm. Six planes from a Kwantung Army air unit made the attack, on the 46th Tank Brigade, 6th Guards Tank Army, near Tongliao, Manchuria. One truck was destroyed, and a Sherman tank was damaged.

Some sources report that a Soviet Navy cutter, KT-152, was sunk by a kamikaze attack on August 18 or August 19, 1945, near Shumushu, Kuriles archipelago.

Kamikazes are remembered until now, they are really extraordinary, a different act of heroism.

During World War II, U-boat warfare was the major component of the Battle of the Atlantic, which lasted the duration of the war. Germany had the largest submarine fleet in World War II, since the Treaty of Versailles had limited the surface navy of Germany to six battleships (of less than 10,000 tonnes each), six cruisers and 12 destroyers. Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote "The only thing that really frightened me during the war was the U-Boat peril".

U-Boat Wolf Pack Tactic

The Wolf Pack or “Rudeltaktik” as the Germans called it was made famous by Karl Donitz and was to have a devastating impact on allied shipping. Despite being implemented only after the fall of France, the origins of this idea first dated back to the First World War. During the First World War, the British had defeated the U-boats by introducing the convoy system. This called for the formation of a group of ships to sail together as a group and under the protection of escort warships. Under the convoy system, U-boats could no longer find isolated easy targets scattered all over. The few U-boats who managed to find a convoy had difficulty attacking as it was escorted by antisubmarine vessels.

The wolf pack tactic was devised to defeat the convoy system. As the British had organized merchant shipping and a defense perimeter around the ships, but the U-boats were still operating singly and in an un-coordinated manner. The idea was to form a pack of U-boats, and to delay an attack until all boats were in position to conduct a massed organized attack. This would overwhelm the escorts as the sheer number and surprise of the attacking boats would throw the defense into disarray. The first boat to make contact was designated as the “shadower” – whose job was to maintain contact and to report the convoy’s position back to BdU. The shadower would remain out of the visible range of the convoy, often submerging by day and traveling on the surface by night. When enough boats have converged with the convoy, BdU would give the signal to attack, usually after dusk where the U-boats’ small silhouette made detection difficult.

Now that the signal to attack was given, each individual commander was free to use any tactics he chose. Some fired at long range, outside the perimeter of the escorts, usually with a spread of several torpedoes. Some, particularly Otto Krteschmer headed straight into the center of the convoy, and fired at point blank range, picking off ship by ship as they sailed passed. Whichever tactics employed, the general strategy was to attack by night, and withdraw by day, with continuous attacks lasting several days, as more boats arrived on the scene.

This had devastating effects and attacking in groups easily overwhelmed the escorts. When an escort pursued one U-boat, another would attack at a different location, creating total confusion and chaos. Kretschmer later wrote in his war diary describing the attack on a convoy, “The destroyers are at their wit’s end. Shooting off star shells the whole time to comfort themselves and each other.”
U-Boat Surfaced Torpedo Attacks

The greatest advantage of a surfaced attack is speed. A surfaced U-boat is highly maneuverable and faster than many escorts. The U-boat can use its speed to run ahead of the convoy in order to setup an attack position. Speed is also essential when penetrating the convoy’s perimeter, as the U-boat can approach and exploit momentary gaps in the escort screen. Another advantage was that enemy escorts are equipped with sonar, an underwater detection device. But on the surface, a U-boat travels without danger of being detected by sonar.

The approach is best made at night, under the cover of darkness. If possible, the approach is made facing the moon, with the bow or stern pointed as much as possible towards the enemy. This makes it harder for enemy lookouts to spot the U-boat. Later in the war, all this would change as radar removes the invincibility of U-boats during night attacks.

For penetration of the perimeter, the ideal position is slightly ahead and on the beam of the convoy. As soon as the escorts have passed, the U-boat can slip into position. This provides the opportunity to attack the convoy broadside with the targets’ angle to bow at about 90 degrees – the optimum firing angle. The optimum firing distance is between 300 to 1,000 meters. Torpedoes require at least 300 meters of run before they arm, so its not possible to attack any closer than 300 meters. The optimum gyro angle of the torpedo is zero degrees. The wider the gyro angle, the higher the chance for error.

Simultaneous targets are ranged and attacked in a single salvo. The most valuable ships in the convoy are placed in the middle of the formation. Those would make the primary targets. In order to maximize the element of surprise, torpedoes are launched at the furthest targets first. This will get the torpedoes to impact at roughly the same time, concealing the element of surprise for a few vital moments more. Large ships may require more than one torpedo hit, but even a single hit will cause the ship to fall out of formation, where it can be picked off later.

Once the torpedo tubes are emptied, the U-boat withdraws using the same way it had used to approach the convoy. This helps conceal the U-boat’s location as the moonlight would be facing its back. If spotted, the U-boat could run at high speeds, before submerging. The torpedo tubes are reloaded (about 10 minutes per tube), and the next phase of attack begins.

Surfaced torpedo attacks are conducted by the First Watch Officer aboard the bridge. He uses the UZO (U-boat targeting optics) aboard the bridge to range and calculate the firing solution. Commands are verbally communicated via a voice tube down to the torpedo crew, who would program and fire the torpedo based on instructions received.

All this time during the engagement, the watch crew are prohibited from witnessing the attack sequence. Four watch crews are on deck, with each covering a 90 degrees arc and they had to strictly scan their respective zones for any activity. They are not allowed to watch the attack to prevent the U-boat from being surprised by a lurking enemy.
U-Boat Evasive Tactics

A U-boat’s best defense is concealment. But once this is blown, the next best recourse is to dive immediately. Ironically, if a U-boat is spotted on the surface, the first thing the escort will do is to shell it immediately and force it to submerge. This will break up the attack sequence and neutralize any threats of torpedo attacks. If given the opportunity, escorts will even ram a U-boat, whether it is on the surface or at periscope depth. The resulting damage will put the escort out of action for many months, but if that could sink a U-boat, then the price was considered well worth it.

Once spotted, a U-boat requires at least 30 seconds to crash dive to a depth deep enough to evade the resulting depth charges. If the attacking vessel is too close, it might have better chances running on the surface to build up sufficient speed before ordering a crash dive. A U-boat can outrun most escorts, including corvettes, but not modern destroyers.

Once underwater, the cat and mouse hunt begins. The escort will be searching for the U-boat by listening in to the hydrophones and pinging with its sonar. On the U-boat, the hydrophone operator too will be listening in for the escort’s screws. He will be able to determine the location, speed and the type of ship (merchant or warship) on the surface. These will provide the only clues as to the activity on the surface.

Depth reduces the effectiveness of sonar. The deeper the U-boat, the more difficult it is to locate. A good evasive measure is to dive as deep as possible and as quickly as possible. This not only reduces the sonar signature, but also provides more time to evade depth charges and will keep the enemy guessing on the U-boat’s location by the time the depth charge reached the desired depth. Also, since sonar is more effective when pulsed at flat surfaces, a skilled commander will try to keep its bow or stern pointed towards the attacker as much as possible. U-boats are capable of very silent operations. But in order to remain undetected, it had to move very slowly underwater, which meant a low speed of only 2 knots. If this was not silent enough, the commander could further order the boat to run on silent mode. In this mode, all non essential activities are halted. Torpedo tubes are not reloaded, bilge pumps are run by hand and all non essential personnel are sent to the bunks. Silent operation keeps the U-boat’s noise low, and also helps to conserve battery power.

There are several occasions when an escort will lose contact with a submerged U-boat. During the explosion of a depth charge, an intermittent blackout occurs, deafening the pursuer’s listening devices until they calibrate themselves. When the escort passes directly above a submerged U-boat, both sonar and hydrophone contacts are lost. Sonar is useless at short ranges and in addition, the U-boat’s position would be out of the sonar’s arc of detection when the ship passes directly above. Also, due to the interference of the ship’s own propeller noise, hydrophones cannot pick up any sound coming directly from astern of the ship. This provided several window of opportunities for a U-boat to change course or to run at high speeds without being detected.

U-boats could also launch BOLD canisters to confuse their attackers. Consisting of a chemical compound which emitted large quantities of gas, the resulting bubble cloud could resemble a submerged U-boat. Unless the sound operator was especially skilled, it was often difficult to distinguish it from a real U-boat. The allies called this a “Submarine Bubble Targer” (SBT).

It was not an easy task locating and attacking a submerged U-boat. Much skill and persistence was needed, and was especially so if the U-boat had already dived very deep beneath the sea. Sometimes escorts forced a U-boat to the surface by waiting it out. Since U-boats had very low underwater speed, escort captains knew that it could not travel very far. In addition, it could not remain submerged for very long periods. Appreciating the fact that carbon dioxide levels will start to rise, escorts will often wait in silence until the U-boat was forced to surface by itself due to the lack of breathing air. During the war, more than a handful of U-boats were defeated by sheer patience.
U-Boat Submerged Torpedo Attacks

Submerged attacks are more difficult but are necessary during daylight or attacks against warships. Underwater a U-boat is slow, un-maneuverable and almost blind. Enemy sonar and hydrophones could also detect a submerged U-boat. Due to its slow underwater speed, the U-boat had to be ahead of the convoy and already in a good attack position. Otherwise it may not be able to reach a favorable attacking position. Remaining concealed and undetected is vitally important, as once a U-boat is detected, the escorts will pursue it or the convoy will change course, leaving the U-boat far out of position.

Once ahead of the convoy, the general approach is to dive deeper until the escorts have passed by. Depth reduces the effectiveness of sonar and through its hydrophones, the U-boat commander can locate the position of the escorts. To avoid detection, the U-boat has to move slowly in order to keep its engine noise low. This also helps conserve battery power. Once inside the convoy perimeter, the U-boat rises to periscope depth. Periscope observations are made in short peeks and at low speeds. Moving at low speed causes less periscope wake, helping to conceal the scope. If possible, the ideal direction of approach is with the sun towards its back. The glare makes it harder for enemy lookouts to spot the scope.

Once in position, the normal targeting procedure takes place. The largest targets are selected and a spread of torpedoes are fired, with the torpedo for furthest target being launched first. The commander is the only one who looked through the attack periscope and he alone made all targeting decisions. When a torpedo is launched, the weight of the boat had to be immediately balanced with ballast, as the launching of a torpedo caused more than a ton of positive buoyancy. If this was not offset by ballast, the boat could pop to the surface, giving away its position. Many U-boats were caught and abruptly attacked due to this simple error.

As soon as a torpedo was launched, the crew timed the torpedo’s run using a stopwatch. They waited and listened for the sound of an explosion at its estimated impact time, and if that did not happen, then it meant that the torpedo had missed its target.

Intercepting Convoys

Almost invariably, convoy interceptions are a result of contact reports provided by BdU. The convoy’s location, estimated speed and bearing are broadcasted together in a contact report. U-boat commanders would use this information to determine whether the convoy was within its reach, and if it was, to plot the most probable point of interception.

A convoy’s speed was given as slow, medium or fast; (slow = 4 to 6 knots, medium = 7 to 9 knots, fast = 10 to 12 knots). Based on this, and together with the current convoy position, it would be possible to calculate how far the convoy would have traveled in a given space of time.

For example, since a fast convoy travels at between 10 to 12 knots, therefore it could travel anywhere within a 120 to 140 nm (nautical mile) radius in a 12 hour timeframe. This is a simple calculation of 10 knots per hour multiplied by 12 hours = 120nm. Assuming that the convoy does not change course, then it would be further possible to narrow down the most probable location of the convoy after 12 hours. Hence, a fast convoy traveling south at between 10 to 12 knots, should probably be between 120 to 140nm south of its current location in 12 hours time.
Remaining Invisible

The most vital asset of a U-boat is the element of surprise. A U-boat possess an exceptional ability to attack and withdraw without being detected. For this, a skilled commander must make every effort to ensure that his boat remains unseen.

In U-boat school, commanders are guided by the principle, “He who sees first, has won!”. This is especially true, in order to prevent the boat from being sighted. Thus, it is of paramount importance that sharp lookouts be posted when operating on the surface. Keeping a vigilant lookout is tiresome, consequently, crews on watch duty should be punctually relieved by the next shift. Four lookouts are posted on the bridge, each systematically organized to scan a 90 degree sector of the U-boat. The horizon is scanned for ships, or for smoke on the horizon, indicating an impending ship. The sea surface is scanned for periscopes and the sky for aircraft. Under no circumstances are lookouts allowed to deviate from their duty. Even during a deck gun engagement, lookouts are not allowed to witness the battle, for fear that the U-boat might be surprised by a lurking enemy. Particular attention should be paid to the sun sector, as visibility is always impaired when looking into the sun’s direction.
U-Boat Deck Gun Attacks

Due to the high rolling and pitching, a U-boat makes a poor gun platform. Furthermore, depending on wind and sea conditions, it was not always possible to man the deck guns. The U-boat’s deck gun was also of no use against enemy warships, as enemy destroyers would easily outgun a U-boat anytime.

Although intended primarily as a defensive weapon, the deck gun however could be used against stragglers and unescorted merchants, and some ships, particularly tankers could be sunk at leisure, even in daylight. It was also useful in conserving the limited torpedo supply and to finish off the kill of a ship crippled by a torpedo. Later in the war, merchants were armed with makeshift guns to repel deck gun attacks by U-boats. It was still possible to attack armed merchants however, as these were frequently manned by civilians with little or no training on naval engagements.

When the deck gun was used, the gun crew had to be secured by life lines to prevent them from being washed overboard. A crew of three manned the deck gun, gunner, layer and loader. For the ammunition, a chain of men had to be setup to bring the rounds from below the deck, to the conning tower and onto the gun crew. A small watertight locker stowed near the gun held a few more rounds ready for use, providing an advantage during the first few vital seconds of engagements. This also meant that crash dives took longer than usual, as the gun had to be secured and crew rushed below deck. There were no range finders, so engagements had to be done at close range. With an experienced crew, the rate of fire was between 15 to 18 rounds per minute. Three types of ammunition could be fired; armor piercing, high explosive and star burst (flare).

In a gunnery duel, the best position for the U-boat is to be at the stern of the victim, at a distance not less than 4,000 meters. An advantage is gained from the rear because the port side guns of the victim cannot be used in retaliation and only the stern guns can be fired. Point the boat towards the target. This presents a smaller target to the enemy, and keeping the bow pointed minimizes the effects of roll and pitch which would undermine accuracy.

Lay alternate fire with the U-boat’s other weapons in order suppress return fire. There is a four second interval between rounds, and while the deck gun is reloaded, open fire with a short burst of anti-aircraft rounds. If within range, small arms fire from the MG34 is very effective at suppressing return fire. Suppressive fire from the 20mm and even the 37mm anti-aircraft cannon will not sink the ship, but is used only to prevent the crews from firing back.

An attack could be aimed at the target’s bridge, waterline or weapon systems. Attacking the bridge will hinder the victim’s steering ability, while attacking at the hull’s waterline would quickly sink the ship. Attacks at the bows or stern will sink the ship faster compared to attacks on an even keel. Attacking the weapon’s systems will hinder the victim’s ability to fire back, but it takes just one unlucky shell to penetrate the U-boat’s hull which will make diving impossible. Armor piercing shells are better suited to hull attacks, while high explosive could be used against other targets.

The standard procedure for opening fire is to aim at the bridge and superstructures with ten rounds of incendiary shells, in order to provide a good marking point from the resulting fire, especially during night or low visibility conditions. The 37mm anti-aircraft cannon and MG34 is fired to suppress enemy resistance. The 20mm anti-aircraft cannon is kept in readiness, and fired only on orders from the commander. Typically, it will be used when there is a jam (stoppage) in the 37mm gun or when enemy resistance is too strong.

While it is better and safer to conduct a submerged torpedo attack, sometimes a U-boat may find itself out of position for a torpedo attack. If a merchant sails at 8 knots and above, and since the maximum underwater speed of a Type VII is also 8 knots, a U-boat had to surface to run its powerful diesel engines in order to catch up with its prey. Without the element of surprise, the deck gun makes a viable alternative.

Throughout the entire engagement, the watch crew are prohibited from witnessing the attack sequence. Four watch crews are on deck, with each covering a 90 degrees arc and they had to strictly scan their respective zones for any activity. They are not allowed to watch the attack to prevent the U-boat from being surprised by a lurking enemy.